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This paper assesses U.S. foreign-exchange intervention since the inception of 
generalized ﬂ  oating. We ﬁ  nd that intervention was by and large ineffectual. We 
ﬁ  rst identify which interventions were successful according to three criteria. 
Then, we test whether the number of observed successes signiﬁ  cantly exceeds 
the amount that would randomly occur given the near-martingale nature of daily 
exchange-rate changes. Finally, we investigate whether the various character-
istics of an intervention—its size, frequency, or coordination—can increase the 
probability of success. We ﬁ  nd that intervention did tend to moderate same-day 
exchange-rate movements relative to the previous day, but this effect is not 
robust across subperiods or currencies and it occurs infrequently. Increasing the 
size of an intervention increases the probability of success, but no other variable 
consistently makes a difference, including coordinating interventions with other 
central banks.
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  Between mid-1973—shortly after the onset of generalized floating—until mid-1995, the 
United States often intervened in the foreign-exchange market. Intervention refers to official 
purchases or sales of foreign exchange undertaken to influence exchange rates. Economists 
persistently questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. operations, primarily because the Federal 
Reserve routinely sterilized the impact of these interventions on the monetary base. Over the 
years, the weight of evidence seems to have gone against an activist intervention policy, but it 
did not entirely rule out such operations. Although the United States, like most other key 
developed countries, currently eschews intervention, differences of opinion about the 
effectiveness of intervention persist.  
  This paper offers an assessment of U. S. intervention since the inception of generalized 
floating. Following Humpage (1999, 2000), we construct success criteria that allow us to assess 
the impact of official interventions on near-term exchange-rate movements. These criteria are 
frequently mentioned in official U.S. discussions of intervention. We test whether the number of 
observed successes using these criteria significantly exceeds the amount that would randomly 
occur given the near-martingale nature of daily exchange-rate changes. Finally, we investigate 
whether the various characteristics of an intervention—its size, frequency, or coordination—can 
increase the probability of its success.  
  We find that U.S. intervention often moderated same-day movements of dollar exchange 
rates relative to the previous day; that is, U.S. intervention showed some limited capacity to 
successfully lean against the wind. Fewer than one-fourth of all U.S. interventions, however, 
were successful in this respect, nor was this result universally robust across time periods and 
currencies. We also find that the ability of U.S. intervention to promote either dollar 2 
 
appreciations or depreciations was nonexistent. The success rate of such attempts was no better 
than random, suggesting that intervention could not maintain an exchange-rate target. That said, 
the larger the size of an intervention, the greater is its probability of success, although an 
intervention can be inefficiently large. Other characteristics of interventions, notably 
coordination, have no apparent influence on success rates.  
  This paper proceeds as follows: The next section distinguishes between sterilized and 
nonsterilized interventions and discusses the theoretical channels through which sterilized 
intervention might operate. Section 3 explains our three success criteria, our data, and our 
counting methods. Section 4 evaluates our success counts under the assumption that successes 
are hypergeometric random variables. Section 5 checks the robustness of our results across 
various subperiods. Section 6 asks if the characteristics of an intervention—its size, frequency, or 
coordination—alters the probability of success. Section 7 concludes with a few comparisons to 
earlier work.  
2. Background 
  In the United States the U.S. Treasury has primary responsibility for foreign-exchange 
intervention.
1 The Federal Reserve, however, maintains its own portfolio of foreign exchange 
and routinely joins with the Treasury in such operations. The Federal Reserve—like most large 
central banks—routinely sterilizes all U.S. foreign-exchange operations in the sense that it does 
not allow these transactions to interfere with the attainment of its near-term monetary-policy 
objectives, like its federal-funds-rate target (Neely 2001, Lecourt and Raymond 2003). 
Sterilization prevents foreign-exchange transactions from interfering with the domestic 
objectives of monetary policy. This is particularly important for countries, like the United States, 3 
 
which have independent central banks, but whose fiscal authorities hold primary responsibility 
for intervention.  
In contrast, nonsterilized intervention, which alters the monetary base, is functionally 
equivalent to introducing an exchange-rate target into a central bank’s reaction function. Bonser-
Neal et al. (1998) and Humpage (1999) suggest that central banks reap no tactical advantage with 
respect to an exchange-rate objective by undertaking nonsterilized intervention instead of 
traditional open-market operations. Moreover, under some types of economic shocks, attempting 
to achieve an exchange-rate objective can interfere with the attainment of a central bank’s 
domestic policy goals.  
Because sterilized intervention has no effect on the monetary base, economists have long 
questioned its effectiveness. Theoretically, sterilized intervention might influence exchange rates 
through either a portfolio-balance channel, an inventory-adjustment channel, or an expectations 
channel. The empirical analysis in this paper—like that in most other papers—is not a direct test 
of any of these mechanisms. Although the design and the results of our tests seem more 
consistent with an expectations channel, than a standard portfolio-balance channel, our successes 
could also include inventory-adjustment affects.  
  A portfolio-balance channel should offer central banks a way to routinely and 
fundamentally affect exchange rates without interfering with their domestic monetary-policy 
objectives. Sterilized intervention has no effect on the monetary base, but it alters the currency 
composition of publically held government securities. Specifically, it increases outstanding debt 
denominated in the currency that central banks are selling relative to debt denominated in the 
currency that central banks are buying. If risk-averse asset holders view securities in different 
currency denominations as imperfect substitutes, they will hold them in their portfolio only if the 4 
 
expected rates of return on these assets compensate them for the perceived risks of doing so.
2 
Asset holders will balk at acquiring an increasingly abundant—hence risky—security. Their 
behavior should force a spot depreciation of the currency that central banks are selling relative to 
the currency that they are buying, which then raises the expected rate of return on securities 
denominated in the depreciating currency. Unfortunately, empirical studies do not find that 
intervention affects exchange rates through a portfolio-balance mechanism (Edison 1993). 
Typically, in these studies, the relevant coefficients are either statistically insignificant, 
quantitatively insignificant, or unstable across time periods and currencies. A notable exception 
is Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) who find support for a portfolio-balance channel.  
  A variation of the standard portfolio-balance channel, the inventory-adjustment 
mechanism, describes how intervention might affect exchange rates in the very short run. It 
suggests that market makers will temporarily alter their exchange-rate quotations following large 
official transactions in order to adjust their portfolios and to avoid maintaining an uncovered 
position over long periods (Even and Lyons 2001, Lyons 2001). These models focus on the role 
of foreign-exchange dealers, who, as market makers, stand ready to buy and sell foreign 
exchange. These same dealers typically do not hold sizable open positions in a foreign currency 
for very long, especially overnight (Cheung and Chinn 2001). They will try to distribute their 
exposure among other dealers and eventually among their commercial customers. This kind of 
adjustment may explain the intraday evidence on intervention (see, for example, Dominguez 
2003). Our results could pick up inventory-adjustment effects.  
Alternatively, sterilized intervention might exert some influence over foreign-exchange 
rates by affecting market expectations about future exchange-rate changes. Unlike the portfolio-
balance mechanism, the expectations channel does not alter the fundamental determinants of 5 
 
exchange rates, but changes perceptions of those fundamentals. This may quickly shift exchange 
rates to an alternative path, but one that is still ultimately consistent with those unchanged 
fundamentals.  
For the expectations channel to work, information must be costly and asymmetrically 
distributed, and monetary authorities must have private information about exchange rates that 
they can convey to the market through their interventions (Baillie, et al. 2000). Survey evidence 
suggests that large foreign-exchange traders have better information than smaller traders. Large 
traders have a broader customer base and market network, which gives them better insight about 
order flow and the activities of other traders (Cheung and Chinn, 2001). They transfer that 
information through their trades. In markets characterized by asymmetric information, 
nonfundamental forces—bandwagon effects, overreaction to news, technical trading—may 
sometimes shape short-term exchange-rate dynamics. Any traders—including central banks—
that others suspect of having superior information could affect prices, if market participants 
observed their trades.  
In extreme cases of information imperfections, when a substantial portion of market 
participants base their trades on extrapolations of past exchange-rate movements, exchange rates 
might remain misaligned, even if more-informed traders feel that current exchange rates are 
inappropriate. In the presence of strong bandwagon effects or collective-action problems, 
individually informed traders may have recently lost money and withdrawn temporarily from the 
market, causing the misalignment to persist. Sterilized intervention—in addition to providing 
information about current fundamentals—might in this case help market participants to 
coordinate on the “correct” equilibrium (Sarno and Taylor, 2001 and Reitz and Taylor, 2008).  6 
 
Intervention can be effective in such markets only if monetary authorities routinely 
possess a significant informational advantage over private-market participants. Mussa (1981) 
initially suggested that central banks might signal unanticipated changes in monetary policy 
through their intervention. Monetary authorities, however, often claim to intervene when they 
view current exchange rates as being inconsistent with market fundamentals defined more 
broadly than just monetary policy. Central banks have large staffs that gather and analyze data, 
and they maintain ongoing informational relationships with major banks. Through their frequent 
contacts with market participants, central banks can aggregate the private information of 
individual traders and disseminate this information through intervention (Popper and 
Montgomery 2001). If monetary authorities routinely have better broad-based information than 
other market participants, then their intervention should accurately predict near-term exchange-
rate movements. We test for such a relationship in the next section.  
3. Success Counts 
  We evaluate the success of U.S. foreign-exchange operations using two specific criteria 
and a general criterion that incorporates the first two. In all of the definitions that follow, It 
designates U.S. intervention on day t, with positive (negative) values being sales (purchases) of 
foreign exchange. St is the opening (9:00 a.m.) spot bid for foreign exchange in the New York 
market on day t measured in foreign-currency units per U.S. dollar, and ΔSt = St+1 – St. The 
change in the exchange rate from the opening on day t to the opening on day t+1, brackets all 
U.S. interventions on day t.
3 The target exchange rate is either German marks per dollar or 
Japanese yen per dollar, and It consists only of the corresponding intervention, that is, dollars 
against German marks or dollars against Japanese yen.  7 
 
  Our first binomial success criterion (SC1) counts an official U.S. sale or purchase of 
foreign exchange on a particular day as a success (SC1=1) if the dollar appreciates or 
depreciates, as the case may be, over that same day:  
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  Our second success criterion (SC2) is consistent with a leaning-against-the-wind 
objective. It scores an intervention as a success (SC2=1) if the United States sells foreign 
exchange and the dollar continues to depreciate, but does so by less than on the previous day. 
Likewise, this criterion counts intervention as a success if the United States buys foreign 
exchange and the dollar continues to appreciate, but does so by less than on the previous day.  
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  Our general success criterion (SC3) incorporates SC1 and SC2. Accordingly, an 
intervention sale of foreign exchange on a particular day is successful (SC3=1) if the dollar 
appreciates or depreciates by less than on the previous day. A corresponding rule holds for dollar 
purchases of foreign exchange.  
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  We measure success over a single day only, which some may find unduly restrictive 
(Goodhart and Hesse 1993, Fatum and Hutchison 2002). Despite the narrow window, the chance 
that we might fail to count an intervention as successful because the appropriate exchange-rate 
movement occurred beyond the opening on day t+1 seems remote. Chang and Taylor (1998), 8 
 
Chueng and Chinn (2001), and Dominguez (2003), among others, suggest that exchange markets 
begin to respond to intervention within minutes or hours, not days. Likewise, a majority of 
central banks in Neely’s (2001) survey contended that exchange rates reflect the full effects of 
intervention within hours. Alternatively, by keeping the window narrow, we may count an 
intervention as a success even though the exchange-rate change that led us to that conclusion 
subsequently disappears. This occurrence is also problematic. Opening the event window beyond 
a single day to limit this problem, however, quickly causes overlap among interventions, making 
inferences about the likelihood of an intervention’s success impossible.  
  Because day-to-day, exchange-rate changes approximate a martingale process, we 
interpret successful interventions as highly persistent, if not permanent, shocks to an exchange 
rate. A successful sterilized intervention will send the exchange rate on an alternative path, but 
one that remains consistent with existing and unchanged market fundamentals. Our methodology 
cannot answer questions about the duration of exchange-rate shocks.  
  Neely (2005) argues that our counting method biases the success counts. He assumes that 
exchange rates and intervention are jointly determined in the following system:  
(7)   t 1 u + = Δ t t I S β  
(8) , u  t 2 + Δ = t t S I δ  
where δ <0 implies leaning against the wind. Under the null hypothesis that intervention is 
ineffective, β=0, the conditional expectation of the exchange-rate change is: 
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(10)  0 ) , ( 2 1 < ⋅ = σ σ δ ρ f , since δ <0. This suggests the following conditional expectation for 
the exchange-rate change associated with intervention sales (equation 11) and purchases 
(equation 12) of foreign exchange:  
(11)     0 ) 0 | ( < > Δ t t I S E
(12)     . 0 ) 0 | ( > < Δ t t I S E
Even though intervention has no effect under the null hypothesis, the conditional expectation of 
the exchange-rate change is negative when the central bank sells foreign exchange and positive 
when the central bank buys foreign exchange, implying that the success counts are similarly 
biased.  
  The assumption underlying Neely’s model seems very strong. Equation 8, the reaction 
function, implies that the central bank routinely knows something about the future change in the 
exchange rate that the market does not know, since ΔSt measures the exchange-rate change from 
the opening of day t to the opening of the next day, t+1. While central bankers may believe that 
the market is inefficient (disorderly), it is unlikely that central bankers routinely have better 
information about future exchange rates than the market.  
We assume instead that intervention is conditioned only on past information, It|Ωt-1, 
where Ωt-1 refers to information existing prior to the intervention decision. Under our 
assumption, δ = 0 in equation 8, and E(ΔSt|Ωt-1) = 0. We assume that the exchange markets have 
the same information set as the central bank, but that the exchange markets do not conform to 
some official interpretation of this information. That is the nature of the asymmetric information 
problem. Under our assumption, the counts are not biased. Intervention can conceivably impart 
some new information relevant to price discovery, but that information is contained in Ωt-1, as in 
Popper and Montgomery (2001). If central-bank intervention does indeed impart new 10 
 
information to the market, private traders will immediately incorporate it into their exchange-rate 
quotes. Our tests are designed to uncover this.  
4. Evaluation 
  Following Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Merton (1981), we evaluate our success 
counts under the assumption that the number of successes is a hypergeometric random variable. 
The hypergeometric distribution seems appropriate because it does not require individual events 
to be independent and does not depend on a presumed probability of an individual success. To 
apply the Henriksson and Merton method we must consider intervention sales and purchases of 
foreign exchange separately.  
Our null hypothesis compares the actual and the expected success counts. We reject the 
null and conclude that intervention successfully affects exchange rates if the success count 
exceeds the expected number by two standard deviations. We reject the null and conclude that 
intervention fails if the actual number of successes lies below the expected number by more than 
two standard deviations. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that the number of 
successes is not different than the number that would randomly occur given the near martingale 
nature of daily exchange-rate changes.  
  This approach also assumes that intervention does not affect the fundamental 
macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates. This assumption seems appropriate given that 
monetary authorities routinely sterilize their interventions and given the lack of evidence that 
sterilized intervention works through a portfolio-balance mechanism. The failure of this 
assumption to hold would bias our results toward finding a high number of successes in any 
sample.  11 
 
  Table 1 presents our results for the entire sample period, 2 March 1973 through 19 March 
1997.
4 During these 6,274 business days, the United States intervened on 971 days against 
German marks and on 243 days against Japanese yen.
5 The first intervention against German 
marks took place on 10 July 1973, and the first intervention against Japanese yen followed on 24 
January 1974. The United States intervened against German marks roughly four times as often as 
it intervened against Japanese yen. Roughly 60 percent of U.S. interventions against Japanese 
yen involved purchases of yen, suggesting that the United States tended to encourage dollar 
depreciations against the yen. Interventions against the German mark were more evenly 
distributed between purchases and sales of marks, with only a slight bias toward mark purchases.  
  The first column in table 1 lists the success criteria for the German mark (top section) and 
Japanese yen (bottom section). The second column shows official U.S. intervention purchases 
and sales. Between 2 March 1973 and 19 March 1997, for example, the United States sold 
German marks on 469 days and bought German marks on 502 days. The next two columns of 
data show intervention successes. Of the 469 U.S. sales of German marks, 136, or 29.0 percent, 
were successful under criterion SC1; that is, each of these 136 interventions was associated with 
a same-day dollar appreciation. The next two columns show virtual successes. Virtual successes 
follow the respective success criteria outlined in equations 1 through 3, absent any consideration 
of intervention. The dollar appreciated against the German mark—whether or not the United 
States intervened against marks—on 2,951, or 47.0 percent, of the 6,274 business days in our 
sample.  
The final two columns in table 1 refer to the hypergeometric distribution. Is successes are 
a hypergeometric random variable, then in a sample of 6,274 observations with a virtual success 
rate of 47.0 percent, we would expect to observe 221 successes in 469 interventions, purely by 12 
 
chance. The observed number of successes, 136, falls more than two standard deviations below 
the expected value. This value is so low that individuals in the market could have bet against the 
United States—bought German marks on day t—and made money on average. From an 
expectations-channel perspective, U.S. sales of German marks signaled that the dollar would 
depreciate on the same day as the intervention. Similar results hold for purchases of German 
marks and for both U.S. official purchases and sales of Japanese yen.  
  In contrast to the results under success criterion SC1, the success counts under SC2, for 
both U.S. interventions against German marks and Japanese yen, are more than two standard 
deviations above their expected values, indicating that U.S. intervention exhibits some short-term 
ability to lean against the wind. When the dollar is depreciating and the United States sells 
foreign exchange, the dollar continues to depreciate, but it does so by less than on the day prior 
to the intervention. Likewise, when the dollar is appreciating and the United States buys foreign 
exchange, the dollar continues to appreciate, but it does so by less than on the day prior to the 
intervention.  
While the successes under criterion SC2 clearly exceed the expected number, the overall 
frequency of this type of success is fairly low. Only 23 percent of all U.S. interventions against 
German marks and 19 percent of all U.S. interventions against Japanese yen were successful 
under the SC2 criterion.  
  The final, general success criterion, SC3, combines SC1 and SC2. Generally, we expect 
that 60 percent of all interventions will be successful under at least one of our success criteria 
purely by chance. The number of successes under SC3 are—with two exceptions—no better than 
random. The first exception is U.S. sales of German marks, whose successes fall more than two 13 
 
standard deviations below the expected number. The second exception is U.S. sales of Japanese 
yen, whose successes fall exactly two standard deviations above the expected number.  
5. Robustness  
  We repeated our counting analysis for various subperiods as a robustness check. First, we 
divided the sample into two parts: The first was from 2 March 1973, when generalized floating 
was just beginning, through 17 April 1981, when the Reagan administration announced its 
minimalist intervention strategy, and the second was from 20 April 1981, the start of the 
minimalist period, through 19 March 1997, the end of our sample period. Next, we divided these 
two subperiods further. Among these subdivisions, two are particularly noteworthy for their 
heavy intervention activity: One, which goes from 15 September 1977 through 5 October 1979, 
was a period of fairly intensive intervention to limit the dollar’s depreciation; another, going 
from 1 April 1985 through 29 April 1988, encompasses the heavy, coordinated Plaza and Louvre 
interventions.  
Table 2, which summaries our key results for the various subperiods, suggests that our 
overall conclusions about intervention and leaning against the wind are not robust across all time 
periods and are not necessarily robust across both currencies within any time period. (Tables 
comparable to table 1 for each of the subperiods appear in the appendix as tables A1 through 
A8.) In table 2, an F indicates that the number of successes falls more than two standard 
deviations below the expected number; an S indicates that the number of successes is more than 
two standard deviations above the expected number, and an R indicates that the number of 
successes falls within two standard deviations of the expected number. Between 2 March 1973 
and 17 April 1981, for example, U.S. intervention against German marks seemed consistently to 
exhibit a leaning-against-the-wind effect, but interventions against Japanese yen were not 14 
 
effective according to any of our criteria. Between 20 April 1981 and 19 March 1997, U.S. 
intervention against German marks seemed to lean against the wind, as did U.S. sales of 
Japanese yen. Although U.S. purchases of Japanese yen scored no better than random, the 
number of success (21) was substantially above the expected number of successes (15).  
Even when we focus on our two narrower subperiods of intensive U.S. intervention, the 
results are still not robust across time periods and currencies. Between 15 September 1977 and 5 
October 1979, the dollar generally depreciated. The United States bought German marks on 175 
days and sold German marks on 58 days. These interventions had a leaning–against-the-wind 
effect. The United States intervened far less in Japanese yen, selling yen on only 10 days and 
buying yen on only 19 days. All of these interventions exhibited a leaning-against-the-wind 
effect except for U.S. sales of Japanese yen, whose success count was no better than random. 
During the Plaza and Louvre interventions, 1 April 1985 through 29 April 1988, none of the 
interventions appear successful under any criterion, except U.S. sales of German marks. All in 
all, U.S. intervention seems to have been a rather hit-or-miss proposition.  
6. Conditional Probability 
  Tables 1 and 2 describe unconditional probabilities of success under our three success 
criteria. The United States, however, could have conceivably increased its odds of success by 
altering certain aspects of the interventions it undertook. Tables 3 and 4 present a series of probit 
regressions that measure the effect of a number of variables on the likelihood of an intervention’s 
success. Each table shows estimates for the entire sample period, but each also contains estimates 
over a subperiod, which allows us to incorporate variables for German and Japanese 
intervention. Data on German intervention against U.S. dollars are available between 1 January 
1976 and 29 December 1995, and data on Japanese intervention against U.S. dollars are available 15 
 
between 1 January 1991 and 19 March 1997. The independent variables that appear individually 
in the probit regressions appear in first column of tables 3 and 4. The dependent variable in all 
cases is the general success criteria, SC3. Table 3 pertains to U.S. intervention against German 
marks and table 4 pertains to U.S. intervention against Japanese yen.  
  A few variables appear to be statistically significant in specific cases, such as lagged 
same-type German intervention, but the only variable that consistently explains the likelihood of 
success across all of the estimates in tables 3 and 4 is the dollar amount of a U.S. intervention. 
The results for the other variables that sometimes appear significant are not robust to changes in 
the sample size (necessary to include foreign intervention) or across both currencies. 
Coordination, for example, is significant for the German mark at t, but lowers the likelihood of 
success. At time t+1, however, coordination is not significant. Given the time difference between 
Frankfurt and New York and given the timing convention in this paper, German intervention 
overlaps two consecutive U.S. observations, so both of these should be compared with U.S. 
intervention on day t. Similarly, the coordination dummy for Japanese intervention on day t is 
significant and suggests that coordinated intervention increases the likelihood of success. Given 
the time difference between Tokyo and New York and given our timing conventions, comparing 
Japanese intervention at t+1 with SC3 at time t seems more appropriate, but when we do so, the 
coefficient suggests that coordinated intervention lowers the likelihood of success.  
  Figure 1 uses the coefficient estimates for the amount of U.S. intervention (exclusive of 
foreign-intervention variables) from tables 3 and 4 to estimate how the probability of success 
responds to the size of intervention. Over the entire sample, the unconditional probability of a 
successful intervention against German marks using the SC3 criterion is 57 percent, while the 
probability of a virtual success is slightly higher, around 60 percent. Based on our estimates, a 16 
 
U.S. intervention of $110 million against German marks has a 60 percent probability of being 
successful. Over the entire sample period, 2 March 1973 through 19 March 1997, fewer than 25 
percent of U.S. interventions against German marks were greater than $100 million. The mean 
intervention in our sample was $80 million, while the median intervention was only $31 million. 
The largest intervention against German marks amounted to $950 million. This amount is more 
than twice as large as was necessary to virtually guarantee success, about $400 million, and 
seems inefficiently large.  
  Similarly, large interventions against Japanese yen increased the probability of success. 
Over the entire sample, the unconditional probability of success (SC3) for interventions against 
Japanese yen was 65 percent, somewhat higher than the probability of a virtual success at 
roughly 60 percent. We find that a U.S. intervention against Japanese yen of $187 million had a 
65 percent probability of success. Over the entire sample, the average U.S. intervention against 
Japanese yen was $131 million, and the median intervention against Japanese yen equaled only 
$90 million. The largest intervention against Japanese yen amounted to $800 million. As is the 
case with U.S. intervention against German marks, this amount seems inefficiently large. We 
estimate that a U.S. intervention of roughly $400 million is sufficient to virtually guarantee 
success against Japanese yen, all else constant.  
7. Conclusion  
  U.S. intervention in the era of floating exchange rates has been, by and large, ineffectual. 
In this paper, we assessed U.S. intervention in terms of two criteria: Was intervention associated 
with an appreciation or depreciation of the dollar, and if not, did intervention then lean against 
the wind? In terms of achieving either of these criteria, roughly 60 percent of all U.S. 
interventions since the inception of floating exchange rates in March 1973 have been successful, 17 
 
but we expected that amount purely by chance given the near-martingale nature of day-to-day 
exchange-rate movements. This overall result occurs primarily because U.S. intervention sales 
and purchase of foreign exchange are generally incapable of promoting a dollar appreciation or 
depreciation. This negative result is robust across time periods and currencies. We find, however, 
that U.S. intervention is able to moderate same-day movements in exchange rates relative to the 
previous days, that is, to lean against the wind.
6 Neely and Weller (1997) and LeBaron (1999) 
cite leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategy as a reason for their finding that intervention 
improves the profitability of technical trading rules. Our second result, however, is not robust 
across all time periods and currencies. Moreover, less than one-fourth of all U.S. interventions 
were successful according to this leaning-against-the-wind criterion.  
  The only conditioning variable that seemed to consistently increase the likelihood of 
success—measured broadly—was the dollar amount of a U.S. intervention. Large intervention 
may better convey private information. Our analysis suggests, however, that amounts much in 
excess of $400 million were excessively large. It does not follow that conducting all 
interventions in excess of $400 million would guarantee success. Large intervention may only 
seem large because the typical intervention over the sample periods was so much smaller.  
We did not find evidence that coordinated intervention increased the likelihood of 
success. The empirical evidence on coordination seems mixed. Humpage (1999) found that 
coordination increased the probability of success by rough 20 percent during the Louvre period 
(1987-1990). Dominquez and Frankel (1993a) also found in favor of coordination. Humpage and 
Osterberg (1990), however, found that unilateral U.S. interventions were more effective than 
coordinated interventions between 1983 and 1990. Chaboud and Humpage (2005) found only 18 
 
weak evidence that coordination increased the probability of success for Japanese interventions 
against dollars between 1991 and 2004. The importance of coordination may be situational.  
  Overall, the limited success record for U.S. intervention and its lack of robustness across 
time periods and currencies within a particular time period argue against an activist approach to 
U.S. intervention. The results suggest that U.S. monetary authorities do not routinely have an 
information advantage over private traders in the foreign exchange market.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 Edison (1993), Alkeminders (1995), Baillie, et al. (2000), Nealy (2005), and Sarno and Taylor (2001) 
provide excellent surveys of intervention.  
 
2 The portfolio balance mechanism also assumes that no restrictions exist on cross-border 
financial flows and that Ricardian-equivalence does not hold.  
 
3 We repeated our count calculation using a closing exchange rate (4:00 p.m.) with  
ΔSt = St – St-1. Our results were similar to the results report in the next section.  
 
4 The United States did not abruptly end its intervention on 19 March 1997. U.S. interventions 
began to taper off in the early 1990s. After August 1995, the United States intervened once 
against Japanese yen on 17 June 1998 and once against euros on 22 September 2000. These last 
two interventions are the only instances of U.S. intervention during the floating exchange rate era 
not included in our analysis. Our exchange rate data determined our sample, which ends on 19 
March 1997. These data are a consistent daily series provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York that starts in early March 1973.  
 
5 The United States intervened against some other European currencies during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, but data on these currencies are not available.  
 
6 Using this same counting technique, Humpage (1999, 2000) reached a similar conclusion for 













10 30 50 80 90 100 150 200 300 400 500TABLE A8: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 2 May 1988 to 19 March 1997
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 2318
Criterion SC1
sell marks 44 22 50.0 1121 48.4 21 3
buy marks 111 54 48.6 1100 47.5 53 5
total 155 76 49.0
Criterion SC2
sell marks 44 6 13.6 274 11.8 5 2
buy marks 111 17 15.3 305 13.2 15 3
total 155 23 14.8
Criterion SC3
sell marks 44 28 63.6 1395 60.2 26 3
buy marks 111 71 64.0 1405 60.6 67 5




sell yen 31 15 48.4 1156 49.9 15 3
buy yen 87 38 43.7 1064 45.9 40 5
total 118 53 44.9
Criterion SC2
sell yen 31 8 25.8 272 11.7 4 2
buy yen 87 14 16.1 305 13.2 11 3
total 118 22 18.6
Criterion SC3
sell yen 31 23 74.2 1428 61.6 19 3
buy yen 87 52 59.8 1369 59.1 51 5
total 118 75 63.6TABLE 1:  SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 2 March 1973 to 19 March 1997
Opening Bid Quotes
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 6274
Criterion SC1
sell marks 469 136 29.0 2951 47.0 220.6 10
buy marks 502 192 38.2 3007 47.9 240.6 11
total 971 328 33.8
Criterion SC2
sell marks 469 117 24.9 820 13.1 61.30 7
buy marks 502 110 21.9 807 12.9 64.57 7
total 971 227 23.4
Criterion SC3
sell marks 469 253 53.9 3771 60.1 282 10
buy marks 502 302 60.2 3814 60.8 305 10




sell yen 94 47 50.0 3000 47.8 45 5
buy yen 149 63 42.3 2836 45.2 67 6
total 243 110 45.3
Criterion SC2
sell yen 94 19 20.2 740 11.8 11 3
buy yen 149 28 18.8 829 13.2 20 4
total 243 47 19.3
Criterion SC3
sell yen 94 66 70.2 3740 59.6 56 5
buy yen 149 92 61.7 3665 58.4 87 6




SUCCESS CRITERION: SC1  SC1  SC2  SC2  SC3  SC3  SC1  SC1  SC2 SC2  SC3  SC3
buy/sell foreign exchange: buy sell buy sell buy sell buy sell buy sell buy sell
2 March 73 ‐ 19 March 97: FFSSFR RRSSRR
2 March 73 ‐ 17 April 81: FFSSFR RRRRRR



















Constant Coefficient Log Likelihood




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value) 0.107 0.001 ‐659.6 6.99
2.18 2.60
             buy foreign exchange (dummy) 0.099 0.158 ‐661.2 3.83
1.71 1.96
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy) 0.018 0.329 ‐654.8 16.44
0.32 4.05
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy) 0.204 ‐0.47 ‐659.92 6.29
4.90 ‐2.49
            consecutive interventions (days) (y ) 0.116 0.02 ‐661.74 2.65
2.05 1.62
            elapse since last intervention (days) 0.165 0.003 ‐661.86 2.41
3.94 1.43
             compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy) 0.183 ‐0.436 ‐662.8 0.60
4.50 ‐0.77
5% p-value 10% p-value
Critical Chi‐Square value   1 d.f. 3.84 2.71TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) : INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION 
                                                AGAINST GERMAN MARKS
Constant Coefficient Log Likelihood




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value) 0.046 0.001 ‐489.9 9.43
0.77 3.01
             buy foreign exchange (dummy) 0.10 0.12 ‐493.7 1.75
1.48 1.32
            coordinated intervention; German on t (dummy) 0.336 ‐0.353 ‐487.5 14.12
5.04 ‐3.75
             coordinated intervention; German on t+1 (dummy) 0.216 ‐0.130 ‐493.6 1.89
3.48 ‐1.37
             total intervention with German at t (abs. value) 0.176 ‐0.0001 ‐494.48 0.19
2.95 ‐0.431
             total intervention with German at t+1 (abs. value) 0.16683 0.00 ‐494.56 0.03
2.795 ‐0.17
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy) 0.017 0.289 ‐489.8 9.49
0.26 3.08
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy) 0.177 ‐0.50 ‐492.8 3.57
3.71 ‐1.87
             consecutive interventions (days) 0.12 0.01 ‐494.2 0.75
1.90 0.87
             elapse since last intervention (days) 0.14 0.003 ‐493.28 2.58
2.91 1.47
              compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy) 0.163 ‐0.417 ‐494.3 0.543
3.47 ‐0.73
5% p-value 10% p-value
Critical Chi‐Square value   1 d.f. 3.84 2.71TABLE 4: INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION AGAINST JAPANESE YEN
Constant Coefficient Log Likelihood




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value) 0.232 0.001 ‐156.2 3.40
2.04 1.79
             buy foreign exchange (dummy) 0.531 ‐0.249 ‐156.8 2.13
3.90 ‐1.45
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy) 0.303 0.151 ‐157.5 0.84
2.67 0.92
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy) not  applicable
            consecutive interventions (days) (y ) 0.391 ‐0.01 ‐157.9 0.04
3.27 ‐0.19
            elapse since last intervention (days) 0.347 0.001 ‐157.2 1.48
4.03 1.05
             compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy) 0.371 5.771 ‐157.5 ‐157.5
4.489 0.001
5% p-value 10% p-value
Critical Chi‐Square value   1 d.f. 3.84 2.71TABLE 4 (CONTINUED): INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION 
                                               AGAINST JAPANESE YEN
Constant Coefficient Log Likelihood




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value) ‐0.706 0.005 ‐9.6 6.58
‐1.11 2.09
            coordinated intervention; Japanes on t (dummy) ‐5.703 6.416 ‐11.5 2.73
0.00 0.00
             coordinated intervention; Japanese on t+1 (dummy) 1.335 ‐1.221 ‐10.9 3.92
2.52 ‐1.87
             total intervention with Japanese at t (abs. value) ‐0.333 0.001 ‐11.0 3.81
‐0.54 1.63
             total intervention with Japanese at t+1 (abs. value) 0.794 ‐0.0003 ‐12.8 0.24
1.63 ‐0.48
             buy foreign exchange (dummy) 0.97 ‐1.642 ‐10.4 5.06
2.75 ‐2.14
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy) 0.634 ‐0.203 ‐12.9 0.06
2.05 ‐0.25
            lagged different‐type intervention (dummy) not  applicable
            consecutive interventions (days) 0.837 ‐0.203 ‐12.9 0.06
0.86 ‐0.25
            elapse since last intervention (days) 0.85 ‐0.003 ‐12.3 1.24
2.30 ‐1.12
             compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy) not  applicable
5% p-value 10% p-value
Critical Chi‐Square value   1 d.f. 3.84 2.71total
total 42 26 61.9
TABLE A1: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 2 March 1973 to 17 April 1981
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 2121
Criterion SC1
sell marks 391 103 26.3 964 45.5 178 9
buy marks 348 124 35.6 1021 48.1 168 9
total 739 227 30.7
Criterion SC2
sell marks 391 100 25.6 296 14.0 55 6
buy marks 348 82 23.6 276 13.0 45 6
total 739 182 24.6
Criterion SC3
sell marks 391 203 51.9 1260 59.4 232 9





sell yen 11 7 63.6 976 46.0 5 2
buy yen 31 11 35.5 910 42.9 13 3
total 42 18 42.9
Criterion SC2
sell yen 11 1 9.1 255 12.0 1 1
buy yen 31 7 22.6 298 14.0 4 2
total 42 8 19.0
Criterion SC3
sell yen 11 8 72.7 1231 58.0 6 2
buy yen 31 18 58.1 1208 57.0 18 3TABLE A2: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 2 March 1973 to 14 September 1977
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 1184
Criterion SC1
sell marks 161 45 28.0 541 45.7 74 6
buy marks 176 67 38.1 560 47.3 83 6
total 337 112 33.2
Criterion SC2
sell marks 161 34 21.1 151 12.8 21 4
buy marks 176 45 25.6 163 13.8 24 4
total 337 79 23.4
Criterion SC3
sell marks 161 79 49.1 692 58.4 94 6
buy marks 176 112 63.6 723 61.1 107 6




sell yen 0 0 na 524 44.3 0 0
buy yen 2 2 100.0 478 40.4 1 1
total 2 2 100.0
Criterion SC2
sell yen 0 0 na 139 11.7 0 0
buy yen 2 0 na 181 15.3 0 1
total 20 n a
Criterion SC3
sell yen 0 0 na 663 56.0 0 0
buy yen 2 2 100.0 659 55.7 1 1
total 2 2 100.0total
total 29 18 62.1
TABLE A3: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 15 September 1977 to 5 October 1979
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 537
Criterion SC1
sell marks 175 43 24.6 222 41.3 72 5
buy marks 58 16 27.6 284 52.9 31 4
total 233 59 25.3
Criterion SC2
sell marks 175 49 28.0 95 17.7 31 4
buy marks 58 12 20.7 53 9.9 6 2
total 233 61 26.2
Criterion SC3
sell marks 175 92 52.6 317 59.0 103 5





sell yen 10 6 60.0 248 46.2 5 2
buy yen 19 5 26.3 255 47.5 9 2
total 29 11 37.9
Criterion SC2
sell yen 10 1 10.0 72 13.4 1 1
buy yen 19 6 31.6 68 12.7 2 1
total 29 7 24.1
Criterion SC3
sell yen 10 7 70.0 320 59.6 6 2
buy yen 19 11 57.9 323 60.1 11 2total
total 11 6 54.5
TABLE A4: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 8 October 1979 to 17 April 1981
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 400
Criterion SC1
sell marks 55 15 27.3 201 50.3 28 3
buy marks 114 41 36.0 177 44.3 50 4
total 169 56 33.1
Criterion SC2
sell marks 55 17 30.9 50 12.5 7 2
buy marks 114 25 21.9 60 15.0 17 3
total 169 42 24.9
Criterion SC3
sell marks 55 32 58.2 251 62.8 35 3





sell yen 1 1 100.0 204 51.0 1 0
buy yen 10 4 40.0 177 44.3 4 2
total 11 5 45.5
Criterion SC2
sell yen 1 0 0.0 44 11.0 0 0
buy yen 10 1 10.0 49 12.3 1 1
total 11 1 9.1
Criterion SC3
sell yen 1 1 100.0 248 62.0 1 0
buy yen 10 5 50.0 226 56.5 6 2total
total 201 131 65.2
TABLE A5: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 20 April 1981 to March 19, 1997
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 4153
Criterion SC1
sell marks 78 33 42.3 1987 47.8 37 4
buy marks 154 68 44.2 1986 47.8 74 6
total 232 101 43.5
Criterion SC2
sell marks 78 17 21.8 524 12.6 10 3
buy marks 154 28 18.2 531 12.8 20 4
total 232 45 19.4
Criterion SC3
sell marks 78 50 64.1 2511 60.5 47 4





sell yen 83 40 48.2 2024 48.7 40 5
buy yen 118 52 44.1 1926 46.4 55 5
total 201 92 45.8
Criterion SC2
sell yen 83 18 21.7 485 11.7 10 3
buy yen 118 21 17.8 531 12.8 15 4
total 201 39 19.4
Criterion SC3
sell yen 83 58 69.9 2509 60.4 50 4
buy yen 118 73 61.9 2457 59.2 70 5TABLE A6: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 20 April 1981 to 29 March 1985
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 1030
Criterion SC1
sell marks 1 0 0.0 517 50.2 1 1
buy marks 24 6 25.0 464 45.0 11 2
total 25 6 24.0
Criterion SC2
sell marks 1 0 0.0 118 11.5 0 0
buy marks 24 7 29.2 146 14.2 3 2
total 25 7 28.0
Criterion SC3
sell marks 1 0 0.0 635 61.7 1 0
buy marks 24 13 54.2 610 59.2 14 2




sell yen 0 0 na 519 50.4 0 0
buy yen 11 4 36.4 449 43.6 5 2
total 11 4 36.4
Criterion SC2
sell yen 0 0 na 102 9.9 0 0
buy yen 11 5 45.5 142 13.8 2 1
total 11 5 45.5
Criterion SC3
sell yen 0 0 na 621 60.3 0 0
buy yen 11 9 81.8 591 57.4 6 2
total 11 9 81.8TABLE A7: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 1 April 1985 to 29 April 1988
OPENING BID QUOTES
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION
German Marks  ##%#%##
Observations: 805
Criterion SC1
sell marks 33 11 33.3 349 43.4 14 3
buy marks 19 8 42.1 421 52.3 10 2
total 52 19 36.5
Criterion SC2
sell marks 33 11 33.3 132 16.4 5 2
buy marks 19 4 21.1 80 9.9 2 1
total 52 15 28.8
Criterion SC3
sell marks 33 22 66.7 481 59.8 20 3
buy marks 19 12 63.2 501 62.2 12 2




sell yen 52 25 48.1 349 43.4 23 3
buy yen 20 10 50.0 412 51.2 10 2
total 72 35 48.6
Criterion SC2
sell yen 52 10 19.2 111 13.8 7 2
buy yen 20 2 10.0 84 10.4 2 1
total 72 12 16.7
Criterion SC3
sell yen 52 35 67.3 460 57.1 30 3
buy yen 20 12 60.0 496 61.6 12 2
total 72 47 65.3